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LIMDTING THE WARRANTLESS SEARCH:
PEOPLEv. MARSHALL 1
In a social climate wherein politicians link votes to "law and order"
proclamations, how shrill will be the voice of the Fourth Amendment?
Frequently the layman, unsophisticated in constitutional principles and safeguards, fails to comprehend why a defendant should be released when his
substantive guilt is not in dispute. The answer is that a rigid adherence to
criminal procedure is necessary to secure our continued liberties.
The Fourth Amendment 2 provides that a search should be conducted
under the authority of a search warrant supported by probable cause. But
it expressly prohibits only unreasonable searches, thereby impliedly authorizing the incidental search. The courts have sanctioned the incidental
search under exigent circumstances. The arrest, however, must be valid at
the inception. The fruits of the search cannot retrospectively furnish
probable cause for arrest. 8 Notwithstanding the well-defined maxim, courts
often experience difficulty in determining whether the incidental search has
in fact been valid. Not only is the police officer acting pursuant to an instant judgment, but also the facts and impressions in a given case may not
lend themselves to explicit analysis.
The adoption of the exclusionary rule, which denies the admission of
illegally obtained evidence, 4 should have increased the use of search warrants. Alarmingly, in the period from 1931 through 1961, the Los Angeles
County Municipal Court issued only 538 search warrants. In the same
period 500,000 felony criminal prosecutions originated in the court."
Available nationwide studies also demonstrate continuing inertia regarding
the issuance of search warrants. 6
1 69 Cal. 2d -, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968).
2 U.S. CoNsr. amend. IV:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
3 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); People v. Haven, 59 Cal. 2d 713,
381 P.2d 927, 31 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1963).
4 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 282 P.2d
905 (1955).
5 Wood, We Should Make Greater Use of Search Warrants, CALIFoRNIA PnAcE
OmcFCR, May-June, 1962, at 27.
6 L. TrFFArN, D. Mcbn'ymn, & D. RoTENBERGO, DETECrION oF CnM 100 (1967).
This volume is the first in a series that will treat the administration of criminal justice.
The series is being developed by the American Bar Foundation. See also Note, Philadelphia Police Practice and the Law of Arrest, 100 U. PA. L. REv. 1182 (1952); Com-
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People v. Marshall has carved limitations into the expediency of the
warrantless search in California. A review of that decision should aid in
determining the impact Marshallmight have on the warrantless arrest.
Defendant Marshall was convicted of possession of marijuana. 8 Police
officers had dispatched an informant to Marshall's apartment to purchase
marijuana. The informant procured the marijuana and delivered it to the
officers, who were waiting in the street. Testimony indicated that the
cannabis emitted a distinct sweet odor. Thereafter the officers decided to
arrest Marshall, although they had neither an arrest warrant nor a search
warrant. They discussed the possibility of obtaining a search warrant, but
dismissed it as impracticable on a Sunday night. When no one responded to
their knock, a police locksmith picked the lock to gain entry. A cursory
check disclosed that no one was present, but one of the officers detected a
sweet odor similar to that which emanated from the package they had
obtained from the informant. The odor was traced to an open bedroom
closet. Wine-soaked marijuana was found in plastic bags within a brown
paper bag contained in an open cardboard box. Upon Marshall's return
home, four hours later, he was arrested.
The court held that the officers had lawfully gained entry into the empty
apartment pursuant to Penal Code section 844. 9 The question arose
whether a search is valid when it precedes the arrest by four hours. Also at
issue was whether the Fourth Amendment will permit their seizing contraband without a search warrant when the contraband is not in plain sight.
The courts have encountered manifest difficulties in seeking to determine
the length and depth of search or, indeed, whether any search may be
conducted prior to an arrest. Recent California and federal decisions
have not settled the dilemma.
In 1948 the United States Supreme Court held, in Trupiano v. United
States,10 that where it was practicable to obtain a search warrant, one
should be obtained. The seizure of an illicit distillery was held to be unreasonable, since it was not done in conformity with the Fourth Amendment. In 1950 Trupiano was overruled by United States v. Rabinowitz,"
which declared a search and seizure reasonable if incident to a valid arrest.
ment, Search and Seizure in the Supreme Court: Shadows on the Fourth Amendment,
28 U. Cm. L. REv. 664 (1961).
7 69 Cal. 2d -, 442 P.2d 665, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1968).
8 CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11530 (West 1964).
9 CAL. PEN. CODE § 844 (West 1956):
To make an arrest, a private person, if the offense be a felony, and in all cases
a peace officer, may break open the door or window of the house in which the
person to be arrested is, or in which they have reasonable grounds for believing
him to be, after having demanded admittance and explained the purpose for which
admittance is desired.
10 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
11 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
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The Court said a search warrant was not the sole determinant of the rea2
sonableness of a search.1
What does "incidental to a lawful arrest" mean? It is here that we tread
the murky abyss. The Supreme Court has said the search must be "contemporaneous' 3 or "substantially contemporaneous' 4 with the arrest, but
it has not yet had to dispose of this question in a difficult fact situation.
The lower federal courts have been seeking to determine whether contraband seized prior to an arrest is admissible evidence. They are able to
distinguish each case on its facts, although it is difficult to predict the
outcome in advance. Cases abound where the court declares the seizure
unreasonable, holding that the search was not incidental to the arrest but
rather that the arrest was incidental to the search. 15
On the other hand, some courts have based their decisions on whether
the search and arrest have constituted one continuous transaction.' 0 By
way of proliferating the labyrinth, the Seventh Circuit recently ruled that
it is permissible for the search to precede the formal arrest where the
search and arrest are nearly simultaneous and essentially constitute but one
transaction. "To hold differently would be to allow a technical formality of
time to control where there has been no real interference with the sub17
stantive rights of defendant.'
8
California has adopted both the "substantially contemporaneous" doctrine
and the "one continuous transaction" doctrine.' 0 In contradistinction to
the federal courts, California has repeatedly held that a legal search may
occur prior to an arrest if the officers have20 probable cause to arrest the
individual whose premises are being searched.
The seizure has been upheld in cases where the defendant was found
in another part of town, 21 and also where the officers entered, seized
evidence, and awaited defendant's return. 22 In People v. Williams 23 defendant was convicted of robbery and burglary. The police, as in the
12

Id. at 65. It is interesting to note that only twice before had the court acted

so quickly in formally reversing itself.
SUPRE E CouRT 108 (1966).
'3

J.

LANDYNSEi,

SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE

Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925).

14 Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964).
'5 Lee v. United States, 232 F.2d 354 (D.C. Cir. 1956); United
204 F. Supp. 760 (N.D. Ohio 1961).
16 Bailey v. United States, 389 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
17 Holt v. Simpson, 340 F.2d 853, 856 (7th Cir. 1965).
18 People v. Doherty, 67 Cal. 2d 9, 429 P.2d 177, 59 Cal. Rptr. 857
19 People v. Acosta, 213 Cal. App. 2d 706, 29 Cal. Rptr. 241 (1963).
20 Willson v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 291, 294 P.2d 36 (1956);
45 Cal. 2d 645, 290 P.2d 531 (1955); People v. Cockrell, 63 Cal.
116, 47 Cal. Rptr. 788 (1965).
21 People v. Vice, 147 Cal. App. 2d 269, 305 P.2d 270 (1956).
22 People v. Luna, 155 Cal. App. 2d 493, 318 P.2d 116 (1957).
23 189 Cal. App. 2d 29, 11 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1961).

States v. Royster,

(1967).
People v. Simon,
2d 659, 408 P.2d
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instant case, had probable cause to make an arrest, entered defendant's
room in his absence, and discovered evidence which was used at the trial.
Defendant was not arrested until four hours later when he returned to the
apartment. It was held that the search was incidental to the arrest.
Under circumstances similar to Williams, the California Supreme Court
reversed Marshall's conviction in a four-to-three decision. The majority
ruled that the search was not substantially contemporaneous with the arrest. In adopting this view, they disapproved of the aforementioned cases
24
to the extent that such cases were contrary to their conclusion.
Chief Justice Traynor, writing for the majority, strictly limited the contemporaneity that can be called "substantial." No longer will a search
conducted four hours prior to arrest be considered incidental to that arrest.
At some point the officers' explorations became an unlawful search and
seizure. Arguably, the search was "one continuous transaction" inasmuch
as the officers never left the premises, but it appears that under these
circumstances such an approach will be unavailing.
Chief Justice Traynor dismissed the search as not "substantially contemporaneous" without defining the term. Suppose Marshall had returned
in five minutes, or in sixty minutes, or had been arrested in a different part
of the city. The Chief Justice was imprecise in overruling the aforementioned
cases. Is it a sound distinction which permits Marshall's premises to be
searched in his presence or if he returns in five minutes, but which disallows it if he successfully eludes the police or returns four hours later?
Marshall casts uncertainty on whether police officers should search after
entering the premises under authority of Penal Code section 844. If the suspect successfully eludes them and returns more than four hours later, or perhaps even sooner, any evidence seized may be inadmissible in court. The
police must not search prematurely. One conclusion to be drawn is that
effective police surveillance in similar situations is exigent.
When the alternatives are considered, the prescience of Chief Justice
Traynor's reasoning becomes clear. To enable the police to search and then
arrest would be productive of misadventure. Notwithstanding the safeguard that there must be probable cause to arrest at the inception, the
temptation accorded zealous officers to make unwarranted invasions of persons and property should be attenuated. Mere inconvenience in obtaining a
search warrant is not a compelling reason to forego constitutional requirements. This is particularly so when there is neither imminence of violence
or destruction of evidence nor any "probability of material change in the
situation during the time necessary to secure [a search] warrant. Moreover,
a short period of watching would have prevented any such possibility. '25
24 69 Cal. 2d -, - n.3, 442 P.2d 665, 671 n.3, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585, 591 n.3 (1968).
25 People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d -,
-,
442 P.2d 665, 671, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585,

591 (1968).

LOYOLA UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2

The cases frequently draw a distinction between being arrested in one's
premises and being arrested away from them. In the former the incidental
search will include the premises, assuming the arrest and search are incidental in point of time, whereas in the latter the premises cannot be searched
in the absence of a search warrant. Noting the danger, Judge Learned
Hand warned, "It is a small consolation to know that one's papers are
26
safe only so long as one is not at home."
Chief Justice Traynor could have reversed the conviction solely on the
ground that the search was not contemporaneous, but he chose to introduce
additional grounds for reversal. Indeed, the principal part of his opinion
and the entire dissent are addressed to a sight-olfaction distinction and to
whether in the course of a lawful search for suspects, police officers may
rely on their sense of smell to seize contraband. The Chief Justice ultimately distinguished contraband that is visually in front of the officers'
noses from that which is olfactorily in front of the officers' noses.
There has been a paucity of cases treating this precise point, but it has
generally been held that officers may employ any of their senses, including
their sense of smell, in searching for contraband.2 7 In United States v,
Mullen28 agents smelled the aroma of whiskey which they believed was
being emitted from an illicit still. The court held that although the odor
might form a valid basis for the issuance of a search warrant, it will not
justify a search and seizure without a warrant.
Chief Justice Traynor conceded that the officers lawfully entered the
premises and that during a search for persons believed to be in hiding,
they may seize evidence "in plain sight."2 9 He recognized that it cannot reasonably be believed that the suspects were hiding in a brown paper bag. He
ruled that "'[i]n plain smell' . . . is plainly not the equivalent of 'in plain
view.' "o As in Mullen, the majority held that detection of contraband by
smell justifies only the issuance of a search warrant, not seizure without a
warrant. Therefore, the officers' invasion of the brown paper bag constituted a search.
What does this distinction mean? People v. Marshall questions whether
olfaction will justify a search of vacant premises without a warrant and concludes that it will not. The majority sanctions police reliance on the sense
of smell, but only to confirm their observation of already visible contraband. 8 '
26 United States v. Kirschenblatt, 16 F.2d 202, 203 (2d Cir. 1926).
27 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948);
People v. Clifton, 169 Cal. App.
2d 617, 337 P.2d 871 (1959).
28 329 F.2d 295 (4th Cir. 1964).
29 People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d -, -, 442 P.2d 665, 668, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585,
588 (1968); People v. Roberts, 47 Cal. 2d 374, 379, 303 P.2d 721, 724 (1956).
30 People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d -, -, 442 P.2d 665, 670, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585,
590 (1968).
31 Id. at -, 442 P.2d at 669, 69 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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Without objecting to Marshall, the State could seek to confine the significance of the case to its facts-the warrantless search of an absent defendant's premises. But a closely linked problem arising from the decision
is whether the sense of smell, unaccompanied by other sensory perceptions
or corroborating information, will justify an arrest without a warrant, thereby
validating the subsequent incidental search. Penal Code section 83682
sanctions warrantless arrests by the police if there is probable cause to believe that defendant has committed a felony. 88 The courts have allowed
the officer to use any of his senses in determining whether an offense has
been committed. 84 However, only two cases have arisen in California where
the court has relied on olfaction to furnish the exclusive cause for arrest
and search without a warrant.
In People v. Bock Leung Chew35 police officers en route to another
apartment in defendant's building detected the odor of opium emanating
from defendant's apartment. Acting without prior knowledge or suspicion,
they gained entry and uncovered yen shee, a derivative of opium. Defendant was arrested the next day. The decision rested neither on the
question of consent nor on the contemporaneity of the search. The issue
was whether the odor indicated an offense being committed in the presence
of the officers. The district court of appeal inferred possession of opium
from detection of its odor, thereby making it tantamount to a felony being
committed in the officers' presence.
In the case of People v. Barcenas3 6 the marijuana odor emanated from a
closed suitcase. The officer's sense of smell furnished probable cause to
arrest the owner of the luggage, thus authorizing an incidental search.
Even in the absence of the sight-olfaction distinction, the Marshall decision casts doubt on the validity of the search in Bock Leung Chew. Since
the search occurred seventeen hours prior to the arrest, it was not sufficiently
contemporaneous with the arrest. But if the fact situation is altered to place
the defendant in the apartment, we are confronted with more perplexing
circumstances. Will the sense of smell still afford probable cause for arrest
thereby validating the incidental search? Marshall is silent on this issue.
Indeed, the majority fails even to cite Bock Leung Chew or Barcenas.
a2 CAL. PEN. CoD § 836 (West Supp. 1968).

A peace officer may make an arrest in obedience to a warrant, or may, without
a warrant, arrest a person:
1. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a public offense in his presence.
2. When a person arrested has committed a felony, although not in his presence.
3. Whenever he has reasonable cause to believe that the person to be arrested
has committed a felony, whether or not a felony has in fact been committed.
33 People v. Williams, 255 Cal. App. 2d 653, 63 Cal. Rptr. 501 (1967).
34 Sarafini v. City and County of San Francisco, 143 Cal. App. 2d 570, 300 P.2d
44 (1956); People v. Hughes, 240 Cal. App. 2d 615, 49 Cal. Rptr. 767 (1966).
35 142 Cal. App. 2d 400, 298 P.2d 118 (1956).
86 251 Cal. App. 2d 405, 59 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1967).
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Analogizing Marshallto this situation dictates the conclusion that olfaction,
operating as the exclusive determinant, will not furnish probable cause to
effect a warrantless arrest. The majority is alarmed at the prospect of
invasions of privacy caused by an erring sense of smell. The same policy
considerations, when extended to arrest, should not render the sense of
smell any less errant. The olfactory sense might be a fruitful means of
law enforcement, but not if it opens the door "to snooping and rummaging
through personal effects."3 7 In light of the reasoning adopted by the majority in Marshall, it would be inconsistent to indirectly predicate a search
on the same grounds they rejected. This conclusion is further supported by
the Chief Justice's concession that there did exist probable cause to obtain
a search warrant. It would be anomalous to deny the search in the Marshall
situation, but to permit it on the basis of the very same sensory perception
because it operates to afford probable cause to make an arrest.
In addition to lending itself to differentiation on its facts, People v. Marshall can be distinguished from the warrantless arrest in terms of policy.
Curtailing the warrantless search of vacant premises will not ordinarily produce the risk that the suspect will escape or that the contraband will be
destroyed. If Marshall precludes arrest on the basis of smell, the difficulties added to law enforcement are evident.
On the other hand, the sense of smell is fruitful only in contraband
crimes such as those involving narcotics or liquor. Since these crimes are
not normally consummated by means of violence, it is not amiss to infix
individual protections. Enforcing constitutional requirements will safeguard
the public without the prospect of violent disorder.
We can expect olfaction, if accompanied by even slight additional information, to provide probable cause for arrest. Whereas Bock Leung Chew
appears to be tacitly overruled on the grounds of contemporaneity of the
search, and of smell affording probable cause to arrest, Barcenas can be
distinguished. In that case the officers had additional corroborating information and did not rely merely on their sense of smell.a8
Perceiving that officers engaged in the often competitive enterprise of
ferreting out crime are sometimes overzealous, Chief Justice Traynor foreclosed unnecessary inroads into the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth
Amendment. By restricting the warrantless search and presumably the warrantless arrest with the attendant incidental search, the Chief Justice responded to the principles generated by the Fourth Amendment.
87 People v. Marshall, 69 Cal. 2d -, -,
442 P.2d 665, 670, 69 Cal. Rptr. 585,
590 (1968).
38 Marshallraises an interesting question regarding the use of Ginger the police dog,
Ginger is trained by the Los Angeles Police Department to sniff out marijuana at
places of its entry. If her sense of smell is vicariously transferred to the officers,
Marshall casts a shadow on the propriety of the subsequent arrest and search. Of
course, judicial notice could be taken of the acuity of Ginger's olfactory sense.
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Conceding that Marshall is guilty of possession of marijuana in a substantive sense, we must not lose sight of the fact that only those searches in
which the police "guess" correctly reach the courts. We never see those
"arrests" where no contraband is uncovered. It can only be speculated
how many law-abiding citizens are subjected to detention or degradation
and their persons or homes searched without unveiling the fruits of crime.8 9
In an area of jurisprudence that abounds with discord, People v. Marshall
seeks to curb the abuses caused by the warrantless search and the warrantless arrest, whether the abuses spring from overzealous law enforcement, or from an erring sense of smell. The Fourth Amendment, vigilantly
reinforced in People v. Marshall, stands ready to guard the people's rights
lest we find ourselves prone to the plight that occasioned the authoring of
the Fourth Amendment.
Richard Ross

39 Justice Jackson, speaking also as a former Attorney General of the United States,
asserted: "Only occasional and more flagrant abuses come to the attention of the
courts. . .
There may be, and I am convinced that there are, many unlawful
searches of homes and automobiles of innocent people which turn up nothing incriminating, in which no arrest is made, about which the courts do nothing, and
about which we never hear." Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 181 (1949),

rehearing denied, 338 U.S. 839 (1949).

